

Rehousing Grenfell Survivors

One Year On

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Introduction

Since the Grenfell Tower fire of 14/15th June 2017, North Kensington Law Centre has provided free legal advice to around 250 households from Grenfell Tower, Grenfell Walk, and the immediate surrounding area. We have focussed on providing access to justice for the community in North Kensington, including ensuring our clients' housing rights are upheld.

Survivors were told they would be rehoused permanently in social housing within 12 months.¹ This target will not be met, a likelihood accepted by Government Ministers as early as March this year.² We are now just days away from reaching the 12-month deadline and the anniversary of the fire. Out of 209 households from Grenfell Tower and Walk, 72 remain in emergency (hotel) accommodation, 55 are residing in temporary accommodation, and just 82 have moved into permanent accommodation.³ Since Easter, just 16 households have moved into permanent accommodation, an average of under two per week.⁴ A further 128 households from the surrounding Lancaster West Estate were evacuated after the fire. Of these, 88 are either in emergency (hotel) or temporary accommodation, and only one has so far secured permanent accommodation.⁵

Due to our role representing clients, we have worked in close proximity to a number of the public authorities to have responded to the fire, including primarily the Royal Borough of Kensington & Chelsea ('RBKC'/'the Council'). It is because of this that we are well placed not only to understand the

¹ RBKC, [Grenfell Rehousing Policy](#), July 2017, p2.

² ['Tories will break pledge to rehouse Grenfell survivors, says Javid'](#), *The Guardian*, 22.03.2018.

³ Figures as of 4 June 2018: Grenfell Support News, [Issue 26](#), 8.06.2018.

⁴ 66 households had moved in to permanent accommodation as of 5 May 2018. Grenfell Support News, [Issue 17](#), 6.04.2018.

⁵ Figures as of 31 May 2018: Grenfell Support News, [Wider Grenfell Housing policy rehousing progress update](#).

needs and concerns of our clients, but crucially to be able to assess the Council's success or otherwise in meeting these.

It is our view that the Council's performance has fallen way short. This has resulted in unacceptable delays to rehousing survivors of the fire. This is of significance not just because most survivors have been forced to wait too long to be rehoused, in breach of the pledges to survivors made by the Government and the Council. But also because the manner in which survivors have been rehoused and the associated delays have added to the community's suffering.

11,000 residents in the North Kensington area are believed to be suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder and other mental health issues following the fire. This includes 900 children.⁶ Research commissioned earlier this year by Mind, the mental health charity, showed that four out of five people with mental health issues had these worsened by a poor housing situation.⁷ These findings have reinforced previous research conducted by Shelter,⁸ the NHS Confederation,⁹ and the Mental Health Foundation,¹⁰ which all demonstrate the clear link between an individual's housing situation and their mental health. The Council's interaction with residents in the period after the fire had the capacity to alleviate some of the trauma of survivors, but instead too often only exacerbated it. In the last 12 months, RBKC has failed to fully grasp this reality and has let down survivors as a result.

It is for these reasons that the Law Centre has compiled this report. It identifies what we believe are the six main barriers to rehousing Grenfell survivors, and makes 12 recommendations to overcome these (a summary of these is included in Appendix A). We have raised these six issues with representatives of RBKC previously. We reiterate them in this document to underline our view that there has been little improvement in RBKC's handling of these matters; in some cases, the situation has even deteriorated.

None of the barriers listed in the report should be considered in isolation from one another. Most are instead inextricably linked: addressing the issues around housing supply necessitates proper needs assessments, which warrants clear communication and a different working culture within RBKC. Indeed, the one theme which spans across these issues is the lack of trust the community in North Kensington has in its local authority. We have seen some instances whereby this deficit in trust has been reduced, but all too often the Council's preventable mistakes have worsened an already dismal situation. The community's mistrust of the Council is not just significant in and of itself, but also presents a significant barrier to the rehousing process.

It is almost exactly 12 months since the fire at Grenfell Tower which killed 72 people and rendered hundreds of survivors homeless. In order to minimise the ongoing trauma of survivors and all those affected, RBKC must take all necessary steps to resolve the issues identified in this report as soon as possible. If it does not, we are concerned that the Council will continue to fail to rehouse survivors adequately and in so doing will worsen the already extremely serious mental health crisis in North Kensington.

⁶ ['11,000 people likely to be left suffering PTSD and mental health problems in wake of Grenfell'](#), *The Daily Telegraph*, 30.10.2017.

⁷ ['Housing Issues are making people's mental health issues worse'](#), *Huffington Post*, 2.05.2018.

⁸ ['The Impact of Housing Problems on Mental Health'](#), Shelter, April 2017.

⁹ ['Poor Housing is Bad for your Mental Health'](#), *The Guardian*, 4.02.2016.

¹⁰ ['Mental Health and Housing'](#), The Mental Health Foundation, 2017.

Issue 1: Housing Supply

RBKC regularly states publicly that it has procured 307 properties to help rehouse Grenfell survivors at a cost of £235m.¹¹ Alleviating some of the issues around supply through this investment was an essential first step towards rehousing such a significant number of households.

However, almost one year on and with 26 households from Grenfell Tower and Grenfell Walk still not having accepted permanent accommodation, it is becoming increasingly clear that the housing stock reserved for Grenfell survivors does not match the needs of those survivors who have not yet accepted permanent accommodation.¹² As of last month, there were still over 100 properties reserved for Grenfell survivors that had not yet been accepted; one quarter of the properties made available at Kensington Row, announced to much fanfare last summer, remain unused.¹³ There is clearly an issue with the suitability of these remaining properties, as they do not match the remaining households' needs.

RBKC, however, continues to insist that it will not procure any additional properties to meet the residual demand for survivors who have not yet been rehoused. This has therefore created a bottleneck. Most survivors evidently do not consider those remaining properties suitable to meet their needs, and the Council appears determined not to procure properties which would meet this need. Instead, money is being spent on hotels and temporary accommodation.

Furthermore, RBKC is not procuring any additional properties to rehouse individuals from the surrounding estate who are traumatised by the events of the fire and cannot continue living in the immediate vicinity of the Tower. Only one household applying under this category (the wider Grenfell area) has successfully moved into permanent accommodation.¹⁴ A Council report has already accepted that its policy to rehouse residents from the wider Grenfell area is insufficient to provide these residents with the ability to meet their housing needs within a reasonable timeframe.¹⁵

Unblocking this supply bottleneck would of course necessitate a further investment being made. Cllr Elizabeth Campbell has said that the Council is 'determined not to leave any stone unturned until we get everyone out of hotels and into permanent accommodation', and that 'every cent of our reserves will be put towards rehousing people'.¹⁶

However, a review into the adequacy of the Council's reserves conducted by the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy, which was submitted to RBKC in December 2017, three months after Cllr Campbell's commitment, states that:

*The Council is still able to manage within its resources going forward without relying on reserves to balance its budget over the medium term. [...] This gives added confidence that reserves have not been reduced to an inappropriate level, given the uncertainty and risks still outstanding.*¹⁷

¹¹ ['Recovery from Grenfell Tower fire "will take a generation"', The Financial Times](#), 30.01.2018.

¹² Figures as of 4 June 2018: Grenfell Support News, [Issue 26](#), 8.06.2018.

¹³ Internal email communications between RBKC and NKLC.

¹⁴ Figures as of 31 May 2018: Grenfell Support News, [Wider Grenfell Housing policy rehousing progress update](#).

¹⁵ [RBKC report to the Grenfell Recovery Scrutiny Committee](#), 20.11.2017, A3, p 13, para 2.4(i).

¹⁶ ['Elizabeth Campbell on Grenfell: "Every cent of reserves will be put towards rehousing people"', Channel 4 News](#), 22.09.2017.

¹⁷ Letter from Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy to RBKC, 18 December 2017, [Executive Decision Report – Leadership Team](#), 10 January 2018, Appendix Four (pp 14-15).

The implication of this is that there remains some room for manoeuvre for RBKC to draw further down on its reserves in order to rehouse those Grenfell survivors who remain without permanent accommodation, while not fundamentally jeopardising its prudent approach to managing reserves and mitigating against any future risks. Four local authorities in London alone are projected to have smaller planned reserves (as a proportion of net spend) than RBKC by March 2019.¹⁸ None of these four other local authorities face similar acute spending circumstances such as that which RBKC has following the Grenfell fire, and none of them face any similar moral obligation to undertake such spending.

If the Leader of the Council is to honour her pledge to Grenfell survivors to spend 'every cent of [RBKC's] reserves towards rehousing' them, the Council must purchase additional housing units which meet the specific needs of those who remain without a home. If RBKC's position has changed and its assessment is that there is no scope within the reserves to procure more properties, it must be honest about that and enquire with central government as to whether it could fund these purchases. The former Secretary of State with responsibility for Grenfell said in the weeks after the fire that 'the Government will do everything [it] can to support the victims of the Grenfell fire now and in the future'.¹⁹ Neither the Government or RBKC can afford to let residents down again.

We therefore recommend that RBKC:

- (a) (i) reconsiders its decision not to procure more housing units to rehouse those Grenfell survivors who have not yet accepted permanent accommodation; and**
- (ii) reconsiders its decision not to procure any housing units for any households from the surrounding area who are unable to continue living in the Lancaster West Estate and require rehousing;**
- (b) if necessary, presses central government to provide the resources to purchase the required additional housing units;**
- (c) publishes up-to-date figures regarding the current state of the Council's reserves and its projected size over the next 12 months to enable proper public scrutiny; and**
- (d) is honest with Grenfell survivors that if more housing units are not procured, then it is likely their housing needs will continue to be unmet for an unclear, indefinite period of time.**

¹⁸ Appendix One, Letter from Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy to RBKC, 18 December 2017, [Executive Decision Report – Leadership Team](#), 10 January 2018, Appendix Four (p 17).

¹⁹ Rt Hon. Sajid Javid MP, [Hansard](#), 26.06.2017, vol 626, col 349.

Issue 2: Needs assessments

The Council has said that in order to ‘provide all households with the best possible housing choice [...] a full and proper assessment of housing needs [must] be made’.²⁰ This is of course correct. However, we have been concerned that, in practice, RBKC has failed to undertake and update these needs assessments consistently and with sufficient effectiveness.

Even in ordinary circumstances, the needs of every individual household are complex and specific to them and their situation, and necessitate awareness of this. The situation regarding Grenfell survivors, however, is of course far from ordinary, warranting an even greater degree of sensitivity and understanding of residents’ needs on the part of frontline Council staff.

Too often, however, Grenfell-affected residents have been treated with a business-as-usual attitude. A tick box approach to assessing needs in these exceptional circumstances will not result in a proper understanding of those needs. Of course, issues around access, disability and care requirements, and the number of bedrooms required are of obvious importance when assessing need. But to develop a proper, three-dimensional assessment in this specific and complex situation, additional focus should have been given to:

- proximity to their place of work;
- proximity to their child’s school;
- proximity to friends, family and carers;
- proximity to any medical or care facilities;
- requirements around not residing above a certain storey within a tower block, for obvious reasons; and
- requirements around not living within sight of the remains of Grenfell Tower.

There have certainly been needs assessments that have been undertaken with the requisite degree of sensitivity and care. However, some assessments have fallen short of these standards, resulting in residents’ needs not being properly accounted for.

Consequently, too many offers of unsuitable housing have been made to Grenfell survivors. This has meant that the rehousing process has been drawn out for far longer than it should have, residents’ mistrust of the Council has deepened, and perceptions of the competence of RBKC has been damaged further.

We therefore recommend RBKC:

- (a) ensures that proper, three-dimensional needs assessments are completed and regularly updated for all residents affected by Grenfell. This will better inform the procurement process for those who have yet to accept permanent accommodation.**

²⁰ RBKC, [Grenfell Rehousing Policy](#), July 2017, p5.

Issue 3: Problems with the permanent housing stock

101 households from Grenfell Tower and Walk have accepted offers of permanent accommodation, but have not yet been able to move into it.²¹ Many of these households accepted offers long ago, but continue to reside in emergency and temporary accommodation.

This delay can be especially frustrating and damaging for a survivor. When a household accepts an offer of housing, often after weeks and months of being made unsuitable offers, most are desperate to move in as soon as reasonably possible and begin the process of rebuilding their lives. Yet, far too frequently, residents have accepted accommodation that is not yet ready to be lived in. Issues such as disrepair, damp and accessibility have prevented survivors' from moving in and often beginning the process of rebuilding their lives. Others face ongoing concerns relating to outstanding problems with their tenancy agreements and survivors are understandably apprehensive about signing these for permanent accommodation. The obvious consequence of this is that residents' trauma has been unnecessarily exacerbated as they wait for what are often relatively simple or trivial matters to be resolved.

Many have also felt forgotten and ignored in this period. They have accepted accommodation, are ready to move in, but often hear nothing from the local authority for significant periods of time. This has further eroded trust and confidence in RBKC, as it becomes easier for residents to question the Council's ability to complete relatively straightforward tasks successfully and in a timely way.

Purchasing such a large number of housing units in this part of West London within such a short timeframe is no easy task. But the fact that so much of this housing stock has lay empty for up to six months as it is being made habitable is illustrative of the fact that many of these purchases were not suitable for addressing the acute need to rehouse Grenfell survivors as soon as possible.

We therefore recommend RBKC:

- (a) urgently fast-tracks the many outstanding repairs and adjustments required to make habitable the permanent accommodation for those households who have already accepted it but have so far been unable to move into it; and**
- (b) learns lessons regarding the type and quality of the purchased properties to improve the process for procuring permanent housing for Grenfell survivors in the future.**

Issue 4: RBKC's working culture and skills

There is a significant trust deficit between the RBKC and residents from the north of the borough. This has been pointed out by the Grenfell Recovery Taskforce in both of its reports,²² as well as by the

²¹ Figures as of 4 June 2018: Grenfell Support News, [Issue 26](#), 8.06.2018.

²² Grenfell Recovery Taskforce, [Initial Report](#) (31 October 2017), p10, and [Second Report](#) (22 March 2018), p2.

Centre for Public Scrutiny's report into governance at the Council.²³ This problem did not begin with the Grenfell Tower disaster, but instead had been left to fester for years, with events in the last 12 months greatly exacerbating the lack of trust North Kensington residents have in their local authority. This lack of trust provides the essential context within which the Council's actions since last June should be judged. It is the starting point for understanding most interactions between the Council and residents. Therefore, it was incumbent on council staff to deal with everyone affected by Grenfell with sensitivity as a matter of course. Instead, we have come across instances in which their conduct has not given residents any opportunity to develop greater trust in the Council. Particularly in the initial months following the fire, we heard accounts of survivors who had been given incorrect information and subject to undue degrees of pressure when making important decisions about their housing. What little trust there may have been in the local authority dissipates quickly in such circumstances.

This is a concern reiterated by the Taskforce, who comment that 'we remain concerned that RBKC is not clearly demonstrating that addressing this trust deficit will require long-term sustained effort and wider social and economic support'.²⁴ It is hard for us to disagree.

The Taskforce also notes its view that 'there is some evidence of improvement' in the standards of empathy and emotional intelligence, but that there is still evidence of 'unsympathetic or inappropriate responses from Council staff and Councillors'.²⁵ This is an assessment that we largely echo, but wish to modify. We believe there have been some overall improvements in this regard and that some elements within the senior leadership of the Council understand the significance of this issue. However, we remain concerned that in particular circumstances the standards of compassion and empathy may even have regressed. For example, we have noticed a worrying pattern whereby some frontline Council staff are becoming increasingly sceptical and cynical about the veracity of residents' claims to be suffering from trauma and the Law Centre's request that they be treated on that basis. This is despite the additional training being provided to front-line staff and councillors.²⁶

Since the Grenfell disaster, the Law Centre has strived to establish a critical, but constructive relationship with RBKC, simultaneously holding it to account whilst seeking to play a positive role by bridging the lack of trust between the local authority and its residents. As the Taskforce has noted, 'local voluntary and community groups within the area have invaluable knowledge and experience and can help improve how RBKC delivers services. [...] This will not be easy, will take considerable time, and will require creativity and a genuine willingness to work constructively, built on mutual trust and respect.' We agree. There are clear benefits from a critical but constructive relationship between advice agencies and the Council.

Community organisations are in a better position to communicate with residents more effectively than RBKC because they are more trusted; as a result, they are often far more effective at relaying the Council's policies, decisions and messages than the Council itself. Some individuals within RBKC have understood the positive outcomes that can be achieved by such a constructive working relationship with community organisations. Others, however, have struggled to grasp this and have instead operated in an overly defensively manner, insisting on a more adversarial relationship. We believe this represents a missed opportunity on the part of the Council to build better working relationships with voluntary and community organisations. More importantly, and therefore disappointingly, we believe such a relationship would have achieved better outcomes for the resident.

²³ Centre for Public Scrutiny, [Change at the Council: Independent Review of Governance of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea](#) (7 March 2018), p9.

²⁴ Grenfell Recovery Taskforce, [Second Report](#), p14.

²⁵ Grenfell Recovery Taskforce, [Second Report](#), pp 2-3.

²⁶ Grenfell Recovery Taskforce, [Second Report](#), p3.

We therefore recommend that RBKC:

- (a) undertakes an urgent skills audit to establish the gaps in the Council's emotional and support training, in order to establish the ways in which the Council's practices can be improved in this area; and**
- (b) includes the value of establishing a constructive, positive working relationship with advice agencies and community groups as a core part of the training and support provided to all relevant front-line Council officers.**

Issue 5: Communications

RBKC has recognised that its communications with residents were sub-standard, and that these had contributed towards alienating many residents in the north of the borough. It was for this reason that Council says it has spent around £1m on recruiting 28 members of staff to work in this area.²⁷

Despite this, the Taskforce has noted that 'effective communication remains poor with little evidence of clear planning or delivery'.²⁸ The Law Centre agrees with this assessment. Our concerns relate to two distinct aspects to the Council's communications.

- (i) The first is regarding RBKC's internal communications, and the Council's failure to ensure all officers and front-line staff are adequately briefed on the information they need to be able to properly advise residents. We were particularly aware of these issues in the initial months after the fire, with frontline Council staff too frequently providing inaccurate information about the Grenfell-specific policies that the Council and the Government was pursuing. For instance, some of our clients were told they would be deemed intentionally homeless if they refused an offer of accommodation, in direct conflict with the Council's policy. Further, survivors have been given inaccurate information about the availability of viewings, inaccurate information about the viewing itself (as well as last minute cancellations), and offered unsuitable properties in the process. Instances like this are of course extremely distressing for the resident, and, moreover, further erodes trust in the Council and its competence.

Additional problems were created in the initial months when residents' key workers and housing officers would regularly change. This prevented continuity and the development of more fruitful, trusting relationships between frontline Council staff and residents.

The Law Centre has also endured protracted conversations with Council officers who have either misunderstood the specific Grenfell policies under which they should be operating, or their practical application. It should not be incumbent on a community law centre, limited as its resources are, to be forced to spend a significant proportion of its energies explaining to the local authority the basic tenets of its own policies. This is inappropriate, places an undue burden on our already stretched resources, and only serves to strain the relationship between the local authority and the Law Centre.

²⁷ '[Grenfell Council accused of wasting up to £1m on communications jobs](#)', *The Guardian*, 9.11.2017.

²⁸ Grenfell Recovery Taskforce, [Second Report](#), p12.

We believe this is a problem partly created by a Council which has hitherto operated too strictly within silos, without sufficiently effective communications that enable departments to work across one another. We understand the Council has attempted to redesign its structures to ensure departments work more holistically, and we await to see whether any progress made in this regard becomes more deeply embedded within RBKC.²⁹

As discussed above, the Law Centre strived to establish a critical but constructive relationship with the local authority following Grenfell, simultaneously holding it to account whilst seeking to bridge the lack of trust between RBKC and its residents. It is our view that RBKC's failure to ensure consistent standards of internal communications impinged on the constructiveness of this relationship, as too much time and energy was spent explaining the basic aspects of our client's situation, rather than attempting to find positive solutions for them.

- (ii) Our second area of concern relates to the Council's external communications with residents. Instead of allowing them to feel listened to and valued, RBKC's communications with residents often leave them confused and concerned, further undermining what little trust they have in their local authority. This has tended to arise when Council departments have operated within silos, with one clearly failing to liaise with another when drafting communications with residents.

To that end, we have sought to influence the content and language used by the Council in its communications with residents, with some success. We would like to see closer collaboration between the local authority and the voluntary sector in order to make further improvements in this regard.

As well as poor quality communications, we have also been aware of absences of communication on the part of the RBKC. Problems regarding the distribution of letters to survivors, particularly those in hotels, were initially very damaging. This issue appears to have improved to an extent over time. Nevertheless, there have been significant periods in which residents have not been kept updated by the Council as to their housing situation. This often results in residents again feeling abandoned and ignored.

When RBKC communicates ineffectively with residents, they often seek the guidance of the voluntary sector, including the Law Centre, to enquire as to why they had not heard from the Council for so long or simply to try to explain the contents of the letter. This causes residents to become apprehensive and anxious, and further undermines trust in the Council. This has had the consequence of, yet again, slowing down the rehousing process.

We therefore recommend that RBKC:

- (a) accelerates its internal information sharing protocol, in order to ensure more holistic working across Council departments, sooner; and**
- (b) further improves its working with local advice agencies and voluntary groups in order to improve the quality of its external communications with residents.**

²⁹ RBKC, '[Report of the Chief Executive: Fit for New Purposes](#)', 12.09.2017.

Issue 6: A new deadline for rehousing survivors

The previous 12-month deadline by which all Grenfell survivors will be resettled in permanent accommodation is due to lapse within days. Only one quarter of those from Grenfell Tower and those evacuated from the surrounding estate that night have moved out into permanent accommodation.³⁰ However, the Government seems reluctant to set a new target, saying in response to a recent written parliamentary question that:

Due to the complexities of each individual case we are unable to provide an exact estimate of when all households from Grenfell Tower or Walk will be permanently rehoused.³¹

We have been concerned that some previous targets related to Grenfell may have induced unintended, negative consequences for residents. For example, the Law Centre had concerns that too many unsuitable, poor quality housing offers were made to survivors within the first three weeks following the fire. This appears to have been done not with a view as to what was in the interest of the survivor, for whom those three weeks was largely a time of confusion, grief and pain. Instead, it appeared to us as though the issuing of those offers was instead designed primarily to satisfy the Prime Minister's timetable.³² Instead of acting as a catalyst, therefore, the Law Centre was concerned that this deadline, partly due to how unrealistic it was, only served to entrench the understandable cynicism and mistrust that residents had towards the public authorities. The Director of the Rugby Portobello Trust was right to say that residents felt deceived by this.³³

Whilst some targets can have inadvertently negative consequences, we are of the view that a further, published target for the permanent rehousing of Grenfell survivors is necessary. It is necessary because, unlike the Prime Minister's three-week target, it would be realistic. That is because all residents should have been rehoused permanently by now. It is therefore not unreasonable that RBKC now uses the lapsing of this previous target to take stock and recalibrate its efforts to meet a new published deadline.

Whilst survivors remain without their own home, the community in North Kensington will not allow RBKC and the Government to forget that fact. However, without the setting and publishing of a new target, we are concerned that it may be harder to hold the authorities to account on its promises to the community in North Kensington.

We therefore recommend that RBKC:

- (a) alongside central government, sets and publishes a new deadline by which all Grenfell survivors will be settled in permanent accommodation.**

³⁰ Figures as of 4 June 2018: Grenfell Support News, [Issue 26](#), 8.06.2018; ³⁰ figures as of 31 May 2018: Grenfell Support News [Wider Grenfell Housing policy rehousing progress update](#).

³¹ James Brokenshire MP, *Written Parliamentary Question*, [145540](#), 25.05.2018.

³² Rt Hon. Theresa May MP, [Hansard](#), 22.06.2017, vol 626, col 167.

³³ ['Grenfell survivors deceived by rehousing promises, charity boss says'](#), *The Guardian*, 23.12.2017.

APPENDIX A - Summary of recommendations

As a matter of urgency, RBKC must:

1. (a) reconsider its decision not to procure more housing units to rehouse those Grenfell survivors who have not yet accepted permanent accommodation; and

(b) reconsider its decision not to procure any housing units for any households from the surrounding area who are unable to continue living in the Lancaster West Estate and require rehousing;
2. if necessary, press central government to provide the resources to purchase the required additional housing units;
3. publish up-to-date figures regarding the current state of the Council's reserves and its projected size over the next 12 months to enable proper public scrutiny;
4. be honest with Grenfell survivors that if more housing units are not procured, then it is likely their housing needs will continue to be unmet for an unclear, indefinite period of time;
5. ensure that proper, three-dimensional needs assessments are completed and regularly updated for all residents affected by Grenfell. This will better inform the procurement process for those who have yet to accept permanent accommodation;
6. urgently fast-track the many outstanding repairs and adjustments required to make habitable the permanent accommodation for those households who have already accepted it but have so far been unable to move into it;
7. learn lessons regarding the type and quality of the purchased properties to improve the process for procuring permanent housing for Grenfell survivors in the future;
8. undertake an urgent skills audit to establish the gaps in the Council's emotional and support training, in order to establish the ways in which the Council's practices can be improved in this area;
9. include the value of establishing a constructive, positive working relationship with advice agencies and community groups as a core part of the training and support provided to all relevant front-line Council officers;
10. accelerate its internal information sharing protocol, in order to ensure more wholistic working across Council departments, sooner;
11. improve its working with local advice agencies and voluntary groups in order to improve the quality of its external communications with residents; and
12. alongside central government, set and publish a new deadline by which all Grenfell survivors will be settled in permanent accommodation.